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From Weregild to a way forward? 
English Restorative Justice in its Historical Context 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article challenges the prevalent view of restorative justice as a new ‘technique’ 
within the English criminal justice system.1  By discussing a number of historical examples 
of non-traditional forms of justice, which the article argues can be seen as largely 
restorative in nature, it suggests that the use of restorative justice in the present day has 
a long tradition, albeit one whose historic practices and processes remain relatively 
unexplored by many criminologists. It does not presume to offer easy answers to the 
effectiveness or otherwise of restorative justice, but rather aims to present the ideas and 
theories behind the concept in an historical context in such a way as to illuminate 
possible avenues forward in its modern applications. 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
Gerry Johnstone, in his inaugural professorial lecture given at Middleton Hall, University of 
Hull, 11 October 2004, stated that: 
Many proponents of restorative justice, I suggest, are inclined to present it as a new 
‘technique’ for dealing with offenders. They have tended to claim that this new 
technique outperforms conventional penal and therapeutic methods of intervention in 
preventing reoffending and producing victim satisfaction with the criminal justice 
system.2 
This interdisciplinary article, written jointly by a criminal justice historian and a 
criminologist, challenges the prevalent view as referred to in the above quotation of 
restorative justice as being a ‘new technique’ within the English criminal justice system; as 
Gade states, ‘several scholars have suggested that the term “restorative justice” has a young 
history’. 3  By discussing a number of historical examples of non-traditional forms of justice 
                                                 
1
 ‘English’ here is but a convenient shorthand for both English and Welsh, as the two countries have largely 
shared a common criminal justice system (both formal and informal) for several centuries. 
2
 G. Johnstone, ‘The Idea of Restorative Justice’ (Inaugural Professorial Lecture given at Middleton Hall, 
University of Hull, 11 October 2004) – available at www2.hull.ac.uk/fass/docs/law-inauguraljohnstone.doc. 
3
 C. Gade, ‘“Restorative Justice”: History of the Term’s International and Danish Use’ in A. Nylund et al. (eds.), 
Nordic Mediation Research (Springer Open, 2018). 
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that were practiced in England, which the article argues can be seen as restorative in nature,  
it argues that restorative justice has a long antecedence, with details of its historic practices 
and processes remaining relatively unexplored by both modern criminologists and 
practitioners, despite Braithwaite reminding us as far back as 2002 that ‘restorative justice 
has been the dominant model of criminal justice throughout most of human history for 
perhaps all the world’s peoples’.4 The article does not presume to offer easy answers to the 
effectiveness or otherwise of restorative justice, but rather aims to present the ideas and 
theories behind the often somewhat nebulous concept of restorative justice in an historical 
context in such a way as to illuminate possible avenues forward in its modern applications 
and to stimulate further discussion. It illustrates that several forms of what we would now 
term ‘restorative justice’ were being practised for centuries before the term is generally 
accepted to have been first use in its modern iteration by psychologist Albert Eglash in 
1975.5 In most (though not all) of the several examples discussed below there is a clear 
separation of restorative justice practices from the more formal criminal justice system 
operating at the time, and this may prove to be a useful guide to the future use of 
restorative justice as an adjunct or parallel to more legalistic criminal justice processes.   
In 1990 Howard Zehr stated that 
Crime is a violation of people and relationships. It creates obligations to make things 
right. Justice involves the victims, the offender and the community, in a search for 
solutions which promote repair, reconciliation, and reassurance. 6 
This article argues that an historical approach to how crimes and justice were dealt with by 
a range of restorative methods can offer a challenging alternative to how modern-day 
restorative justice is viewed by criminologists and that the approach to justice as defined by 
Zehr above is evident in all of the following examples. 
 
II MODERN PERCEPTIONS OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
                                                 
4
 J. Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive regulation (OUP, 2002), p. 5.  
5
 Eglash used the term in a 1975 conference paper, but it did not appear in print until 1977, when Eglash’s 
paper was published in J. Hudson, and B. Galaway (eds.), Restitution in criminal justice: A critical assessment of 
sanctions (Lexington Books, 1977). Recent research by Gade has uncovered several earlier uses of the term 
‘restorative justice’ but such usage appears to have been overwhelmingly religious and mentioned within a 
specifically Christian context, rather than in its modern context (see Gade, 2018). 
6
 H. Zehr, Changing Lenses: A New Focus on Crime and Justice (Herald Press, 1990), p. 181. 
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Restorative justice is still an essentially contested subject throughout the extant literature, 
with much discussion on what constitutes being restorative and whether we are referring to 
a process, outcomes or values. Modern restorative justice theory has evolved from 
numerous disciplines and bodies of work, all with the commonality of a dissatisfaction with 
the existing criminal justice system; however this means that there can be difficulties in 
discussing what it actually means to be restorative.7 A wide range of literature argues that 
restorative justice is inspired by the approaches of various indigenous groups globally, for 
example, in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. In indigenous groups justice was and 
remains closely linked with spirituality, with an emphasis on the restoration of harmony and 
balance in the group.8 When harm had been caused it was important for the wrong-doer to 
take responsibility for their actions and try and make amends, but also for the community to 
remain cohesive. Issues would be dealt with within the community in order to ensure the 
wrong-doer remained integrated and connected to the community. It is however interesting 
to note that whilst several of these practices have been at least partially incorporated into 
the State-based criminal justice systems of many countries, Aboriginal processes have been 
largely subsumed within a fundamentally Western-centric system, often to the detriment of 
many Aboriginal concepts of justice. 9 
Daly and Immarigeon argue that contemporary restorative justice theories arise from a 
social movement in the 1970s and are grounded in writing by scholars from a disparate and 
wide-ranging background: feminist theories of justice, psychological theories, peace-making 
criminology, and religious and spiritual theories.10 Christie contributed to this movement 
claiming that the state had ‘stolen’ conflict from victims, and therefore stolen their chance 
to recover from the crime.11 Christie argued that conflicts are important parts of society, 
and victims of crime in particular had lost their rights to participate in dealing with this 
                                                 
7
 H. Zehr, The Little Book of Restorative Justice (Good Books, 2002, revised 2014). 
8
 See L. Mirsky, Restorative justice practices of Native American, First Nation and other indigenous people of 
North America: Parts One and Two (Restorative Practices eForum, 2004, April and May); and T. Wachtel, 
Dreaming of a New Reality: How restorative practices reduce crime and violence, improve relationships and 
strengthen civil society (The Piper’s Press, 2013). 
9
 J.R. Guest, ‘Aboriginal Legal Theory and Restorative Justice’ (1999) Justice as Healing discusses the fact that 
First Nations Aboriginals have been trying to replace such Western-based legislation and processes with a 
more culturally relevant system. See also M. Achtenberg, Understanding restorative justice practice within the 
Aboriginal context (Forum on Corrections Research, 2013. 
10
 K. Daly and R. Immarigeon, ‘The past, present, and future of restorative justice: some critical reflections’ 
(1998) The Contemporary Justice Review. 
11
 N. Christie, ‘Conflicts as Property’ (1977) British Journal of Criminology. 
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conflict as the field was monopolised by the state.12 The historical justice practices discussed 
in this article do in fact reclaim the ‘conflict’ and deal with them within communities more 
informally. Two of the main underpinning theories of current restorative justice will be used 
to assess how these historical practices may have been restorative in nature, and whether 
there is potential to learn from these practices. 
McCold suggests that not all practitioners and academics are discussing the same thing 
when they discuss restorative justice.13 This conceptual difficulty has an effect on defining 
restorative justice in any succinct way. The most widely accepted definition in England and 
Wales comes from Marshall who defines restorative justice as: 
a process whereby all the parties with a stake in a particular offence come together to resolve 
collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its implications for the future.14 
Restorative justice is seen as difficult to define as there is some discussion as to whether it 
should be defined as a process or an outcome.15. Some describe restorative justice as a set 
of ideals or values, whereas others view restorative justice as a movement.16 Zehr states 
that in the criminal justice arena, restorative justice addresses the violation of relationships 
and not the violation of rules.17 In the criminal justice context, restorative approaches allow 
those who have been affected by a crime to come together and for the perpetrator to 
realise the full impact of this crime. Stakeholders must then all agree on a way that this 
crime can be put right. Throughout the literature, arguments exist as to whether a definition 
of restorative justice is needed. Zehr and Mika believe that a definition would not be 
particularly helpful for the literature, however others argue that in order to have a 
                                                 
12
 This resonates with the traditional view of the state monopolisation of policing from the mid-nineteenth 
century onward – see D. Churchill, Crime Control & Everyday Live in the Victorian City: The Police & the Public 
(OUP, 2018) for a detailed discussion of this theory. 
13
 P. McCold, ‘Restorative Justice Practice: The State of the Field 1999’, Paper presented at the Building Strong 
Partnerships for Restorative Practices conference, Burlington, Vermont, 5-7 August 1999. 
14
 T.F. Marshall, ‘The evolution of restorative justice in Britain’ (1996) European Journal of Criminal Policy and 
Research, p. 37. 
15
 A. Crawford and T. Newburn, Youth offending and restorative justice: implementing reform in youth justice 
(Willan, 2003). 
16
 See for example K. Daly, ‘The limits of restorative justice’, in D. Sullivan and L. Tifft (eds.), Handbook of 
Restorative Justice: A Global Perspective (Routledge, 2006); J. Braithwaite, ‘Principles of Restorative Justice’ in 
A. von Hirsch, J.V. Roberts, A.E. Bottoms, K. Roach and M. Schiff (eds.), Restorative Justice and Criminal Justice: 
Competing or Reconcilable Paradigms? (Hart Publishing, 2004); G. Johnstone, Restorative Justice: Ideas, 
Values, Debates. 2nd edition (Routledge, 2011); H. Zehr, The Little Book of Restorative Justice (Good Books, 
2002, revised 2014). 
17
 H. Zehr, Retributive justice, restorative justice. New Perspectives on Crime and Justice – Occasional Paper 
Series (Canada Victim Offender Ministries, 1985). 
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comprehensive understand of what restorative justice actually is there needs to be a 
universally accepted definition.18 
Restorative justice can be seen as challenging to modern English sensibilities; the traditional 
criminal justice system of judge or magistrate, jury, trial and sentence, is so ingrained within 
our collective thought that other ways of looking at offending and justice are often viewed 
with suspicion and mistrust. From an historical point of view however, this is an untenable 
approach; our ‘traditional’ criminal justice system is in fact largely a modern construct. For 
example, the presumption of innocence until found guilty by one’s peers arguably did not 
gain popular credence until the latter half of the nineteenth century. Before then, if one 
appeared in court as a suspect, the general consensus was that one was there for a good 
reason, as trials could cost private prosecutors (usually the victim) a lot of money and were 
therefore not entered into lightly.19 Before the Prisoners’ Counsel Act 1836, defendants had 
no formal right to defence counsel (although some judges permitted legal representation on 
the defendant’s behalf), and trial by jury was of course limited to being decided by an all-
male jury until after the First World War, with magistrates’ benches being similarly 
exclusively male until 1919. 20  Furthermore it was not until 1933 that the Grand Jury (a 
committee of the ’great and the good’ who decided whether a trial at either Quarter 
Sessions or the Assizes should proceed or there was No True Bill to be heard (i.e. there was 
thought to be not enough evidence for the prosecution of the suspect to continue) was 
abolished, thereby heralding the end of a remanent of what could be considered a largely 
feudal system. 
The article therefore discusses several practices that the authors argue could be conceived 
of as being restorative in action, from the practice of ‘weregild’ in the Anglo-Saxon period 
through ritualistic public shaming, informal punishment by early nineteenth century JPs, and 
                                                 
18
 H. Zehr and H. Mika, ‘Fundamental concepts of restorative justice’ (1998) Contemporary Justice Review; D. 
Miers, M. Maguire, S. Goldie, K. Sharpe, C. Hale, A. Netten, S. Uglow, K. Doolin, A. Hallam, J. Enterkin, and T. 
Newburn, ‘An exploratory evaluation of restorative justice schemes’ in B. Webb (ed.), Crime Reduction 
Research Series, Paper 9 (Home Office, 2002).. 
19
 Admittedly, there was also a degree of concern over malicious prosecutions in the period 1750 -1850, which 
led to a degree of official mistrust of victims – see D. Hay, ‘Prosecution and Power: Malicious Prosecution in 
the English Courts, 1750-1850’ in D. Hay and F. Snyder (eds.), Policing and prosecution in Britain 1750-
1850 (OUP, 1989), pp. 343-395. It was not until the second half of the nineteenth century until police forces 
(county and borough) began to take on the role of prosecutor (a role which they retained for over a century 
until the creation of the Crown Prosecution Service in 1985). 
20
 Councillor Ada Summers became Britain’s first female magistrate at Stalybridge, Cheshire (now part of 
Greater Manchester) after being sworn in on 31 December 1919 (The Times, 1 January 1920). 
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printed public apologies for bad behaviour in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
newspapers as an example of reintegrative shaming.  
 
III WEREGILD AS A FORM OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
Weregild (also known more prosaically as ‘man-price’ or ‘blood-money’) was a type of 
financial restorative justice operated under Salic law, which was first codified around AD500 
by the Frankish king, Clovis (c.AD466-511) and could be considered the ultimate example of 
what Braithwaite terms ‘reintegrative shaming’, by which a transgressor is punished for the 
offence and then reintegrated into his or her community.21 Its use in England dates from at 
least the early seventh century AD following the various invasions of Germanic tribespeople 
after the departure of the Romans in the early fifth century AD. The system was complex, 
but its basic premise was that every piece of property, together with every human life, had 
an equivalent and prescribed financial value. This resulted in a scale of financial restitution 
that could be offered to either the victim (in cases of theft or misappropriation) or (in the 
case of homicide) the family of the victim as full and final atonement for the offence.22 The 
rationale behind weregild was to avoid the possibility of a blood feud, in which a member of 
the victim’s family would kill a member of the offender’s family in revenge and thus set in 
motion a feud that could last generations.23 
Thomas et al argue that weregild can be seen as a type of apartheid, insofar as several laws 
throughout seventh-century Anglo-Saxon England clearly differentiate between Saxons and 
other ethnicities; for example, in the late-seventh century, King Ine of Wessex (ruled AD688-
726) decreed the weregild of a Saxon to be between two and five times the value of a Briton 
of comparable social status.24 Women were also covered by weregild, although their killing 
often demanded lesser payments than those of men – although this was not the case in 
some Germanic tribes; for example the Alamanni (aka Swabians) demanded a weregild 
                                                 
21
 For a detailed discussion of the term and the differences between ‘reintegrative’ and ‘disintegrative’ 
shaming, see J. Braithwaite, Crime, shame and reintegration (CUP, 1989). For a discussion of the origins of Salic 
Law, see K.F. Drew (ed), The Laws of the Salian Franks (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012).  
22
 Weregild did not differentiate between murder and manslaughter. 
23
 There has been recent discussion as to the exact nature and prevalence of such feuds in Anglo-Saxon society 
– see J.D. Niles, ‘The myth of the feud in Anglo-Saxon England’ (2015) Journal of English and Germanic 
Philology. 
24
 M.G. Thomas, M.P. Stumpf and H. Härke, ‘Evidence for an apartheid-like social structure in early Anglo-
Saxon England’ (2006) Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences. 
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payable to the family of a murdered woman twice or more that of a man of equal social 
status.25 
The idea of a person’s life having a financial value at first sight appears anathema to modern 
eyes; but this, it could be argued, is because we in England are so conditioned by our unique 
combination of common law and elements of bastardised Roman law, to think of an 
offender’s debt being to that of the State rather than to the immediate family of the victim, 
and also that the offender must be punished either formerly by the imposition of a death 
penalty or more latterly by a substantial period of imprisonment.26 It could be argued that a 
modern version of weregild has in fact been recreated in civil courts rather than criminal 
courts in the form of wrongful death judgements; the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (amended 
under the Administration of Justice Act 1982) allows for dependency, bereavement and 
funeral cost claims to be sought by dependents following a wrongful death.27  Weregild also 
applied to stolen property and here modern sensibilities appear to be less offended; 
financial recompense for inanimate objects such as goods or property is more reasonable 
and familiar to us in the form of compensation. 
 
IV INFORMAL RITUALISTIC SHAMING AS A FORM OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
 
From the mediaeval era through to the early modern period ritualistic shaming acts such as 
the Skimmington – see Figure 1 below (in which victim(s) were paraded through the local 
community usually seated backwards on a horse, surrounding by a clamorous crowd 
shouting and beating on pots and pans) were largely used in response to what Stephen 
Banks in his excellent recent study of informal justice in the period 1760-1914 terms 
‘inappropriate gender behaviours’ such as cuckolding or scolding.28 Banks points out that 
‘most public collective acts were intended primarily to shame their victims rather than to 
                                                 
25
 D. Herlihy, ‘Life expectancies for women’, in R. T. Morewedge (ed.) The Role of Woman in the Middle Ages 
(State University of New York Press, 1972), pp. 6-7.  
26
 For an excellent overview of the development and history of Roman Law, see P. Stein, Roman Law in 
European History (CUP, 1999). 
27
 Civil law exists to protect individuals from the actions of one another and the State, whereas criminal law is 
concerned with offences against society as a whole. 
28
 S. Banks, Informal Justice in England and Wales 1760-1914: The Courts of Popular Opinion (The Boydell 
Press, 2014), p. vii. Such shamings had many regional variants in name; for example, ‘Riding the Stang’ in 
northern England, the ‘Skimmington’ in southern England, the ‘Ceffyl Pren’ in Wales and more generically, 
‘Rough Music’, but all followed a similar pattern of ritual humiliation in front of one’s peers. 
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harm them’; whilst there was undoubtedly an element of punishment intended, such 
actions were not designed to be malicious in nature, but were a local sub-judicial response 
to perceived bad behaviour of a member of the community – making a clear distinction 
between bad behaviour and a ‘bad’ person.29 He further suggests that this is an approach 
which indicates that legal belief mattered as much as legal reality – i.e. what sectors of the 
local populace considered to be the law as opposed to what was ‘The Law’ underlay much 
of this type of shaming. 
 
 
Figure 1 Hudibras encountering a Skimmington, engraving by William Hogarth, 1726 
(author’s collection) 
   
This is clearly illustrated in Samuel Butler’s epic mock-heroic poem Hudibras (first published 
in 1684 as an often ribald and scathing Restoration satire, similar in structure and story to 
Cervantes’ Don Quixote), in which the eponymous ‘anti-hero’, an unlikeable knight errant, 
receives a raw egg in his eye for mistakenly (and loudly) denouncing a Skimmington that he 
encounters as ‘an ‘Antichristian opera’. It is left to his much more intelligent and worldly-
                                                 
29
 Ibid, p. vii. Banks recognises that some instances of rough music could occasionally result in more serious 
consequences in which offenders were not reintegrated into their community; he gives an example of ‘five 
licentious women’ who were paraded through the streets of London before being imprisoned in Newgate and 
subsequently banished from the City in 1529 - see Banks, Informal Justice in England and Wales, p. 26. 
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wise squire Ralpho to explain that it is in fact a shaming ritual designed to embarrass both a 
scolding wife and her hen-pecked (and cuckolded) husband: 
‘(It) is but a riding, us'd of course  
When the grey mare's the better horse;  
When o'er the breeches greedy women  
Fight to extend their vast dominion;  
And in the cause impatient Grizel  
Has drubb'd her Husband with bull's pizzle,  
And brought him under Covert-Baron,  
To turn her vassal with a murrain;  
When wives their sexes shift, like hares,   
And ride their husbands like night-mares,  
And they in mortal battle vanquish'd, 
Are of their charter disenfranchis'd  
And by the right of war, like gills,  
Condemn'd to distaff, horns, and wheels:  
For when men by their wives are cow'd,  
Their horns of course are understood.30 
Those conducting such public shaming clearly considered themselves to be acting within the 
confines of what they viewed to be the law of the land (or at least the law of their locale), 
and were carrying out what could be argued to be an early form of restorative justice; 
although there was clearly a disintegrative element in the shaming, following the ritualistic 
exposure of their perceived shortcomings in such ‘rough music’ ceremonies, the victim(s) 
were eventually usually allowed to take their place back in the community with no further 
penalty being imposed – an early example of reintegrative shaming? Banks argues that such 
shaming rituals continued (albeit often in a largely bastardised form) well into the twentieth 
                                                 
30
 S. Butler, Hudibras in three parts, written in the time of the late wars (Vernor and Hood, 1805), lines 698-
712. ’Covert Baron’ refers to the legal protection of a wife by her husband, whilst the phrase ‘turn her vassal 
with a murrain’ means that the overbearing wife has turned her meek husband into a slave by means of a 
disease or pestilence (most likely a sexually transmitted disease). ‘Their horns of course are understood’ refers 
to the practice of depicting a cuckolded husband as wearing the horns or antlers of an unsuccessful stag who 
loses his mate during a fight in the rutting season. The term ‘cuckold’ probably derives from the adulterous 
female seen to be harbouring a cuckoo (i.e. her lover) in the domestic nest. 
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century, with the last report of a Skimmington being practised in the early 1950s in Sussex.31  
Croll gives several examples of public shaming through the use of local newspapers in the 
Victorian period, and it can be argued that such ritual shaming has continued in a more 
recognisably modern form; in 2005 Central Trains became the first of several British train 
operators to put up posters naming and shaming convicted fare dodgers in prominent 
positions on their station platforms.32  These posters gave the name, age and address of 
offenders (all of which were of course in the public record), and the posters were viewed as 
somewhat controversial. 33 Of course, in the modern cases, such public shaming was in 
addition to any fines imposed by the courts; naming and shaming in this case being used by 
corporate bodies rather than individuals and as an adjunct to more formal legal process 
rather than as an alternative method of restorative justice. 
 
V ‘INFORMAL’ FORMAL JUSTICE – THE RESTORATIVE JUSTICE MEASURES OF A NINETEENTH-
CENTURY SHROPSHIRE MAGISTRATE 
Thomas Netherton Parker MA (1772-1848) was Deputy Lieutenant of Shropshire, a 
landowner and a magistrate for Oswestry borough and the county of Shropshire, who kept 
two ‘Justice’s Notebooks’ between March 1805 and June 1843, in which he detailed many of 
the grievances that came before him. This in itself is not so unusual; many Justices of the 
Peace appear to have kept some working record of their time in office. However, what is 
unusual is that these particular notebooks survive, and they offer a unique insight into the 
workings of the mind of an early-nineteenth-century magistrate.34 Parker was interested in 
                                                 
31
 S. Banks, Informal Justice in England and Wales 1760-1914, p. 198. 
32
 A. Croll, ‘Street disorders, surveillance and shame: regulating behavior in the public spaces of the late 
Victorian British town, (1999) Social History. 
33
 In Telford ‘in 2011, a man who had changed his name by deed poll to Darth Vader was found guilty of non-
payment of a train fare and was publicly shamed under that name on such a poster – see 
http://www.shropshirestar.com/news/2011/01/27/im-no-fare-e-vader-says-lord-darth/. 
34
 Thomas Netherton Parker, Justice's Book, 1805–1813, Shropshire Archives 1060-168 and Thomas Netherton 
Parker, Justice's Book, 1813-1843, Shropshire Archives 1060-171. Less than 40 such notebooks appear to have 
survived from the late seventeenth century to the mid-nineteenth century, and each one of them is a treasure 
trove of cases that would have otherwise remained largely unknown to history, as the majority of the cases 
either never saw a higher court or were not reported in newspapers. See N.E.C. Darby, The magistrate and the 
community: summary proceedings in rural England during the long eighteenth century (Unpublished Doctoral 
thesis, The University of Northampton, 2015), for a detailed account of the workings of magistrates in 
summary courts in the early modern period. 
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a wide range of contemporary issues, including poor relief and the condition of the 
agricultural labourer.35  
His notebooks (which details well over five hundred cases) contain the usual cross-section of 
offences that came before a provincial JP: minor assaults, petty theft, abscondence from 
service etc.  However, they also illustrate the fact that until petty sessions were put on a 
more formal footing in the mid-nineteenth century, as Darby states, ‘rural magistrates had a 
more individualised approach to their summary work and decision-making than their 
London equivalents’; they heard far fewer cases and were in many cases far more closely 
involved in communal activities and daily life.36 In a significant number of cases, Parker 
excercised a considerable amount of judicial discretion in dealing with both suspects and 
alleged victims, most notably in cases involving offences against the person and 
master/servant quarrels.  Many of the complaints brought before Parker concerned minor 
scuffles (both verbal and physical) between individuals; and in numerous such cases Parker 
appears to have gone out of his way to avoid involving the parties in a more formal legal 
process. He attempted to get the individuals concerned to settle their dispute in an 
amicable and informal manner, by settling their differences and shaking hands before him. 
In this way, both honour and justice were satisfied. 
Darby’s research has confirmed that this was not unique to Parker; she summarises her 
findings with regard to assault cases from studying the notebooks of over a dozen 
magistrates in central and southern England in the table reproduced below; this shows that 
over half of all assault cases mentioned in her sources were either agreed before 
commencement of formal court proceedings or were dismissed: 
 
Action taken in assault cases, where specified.37 
Number   Percentage 
Agreed    177    44% 
Further action   110    28% 
                                                 
35
 He also invented a novel (and highly complex) turnpike gate, an amusing animated model of which can be 
found at http://www.rigb.org/blog/2015/september/reflections-on-a-farm-gate. 
36
 Darby, The magistrate and the community, Abstract. This is not to deny that urban magistrates could also 
show similar initiative or discretion – see J. Davis, ‘A Poor Man’s System of Justice: The London Police Courts in 
the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century’ (1984) The Historical Journal for several such examples. 
37
 Reproduced from Darby, The magistrate and the community, Table 5.1, p. 290. 
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Dismissed    51    13% 
Order    31    8% 
Summary punishment  27    7% 
Total    396    100% 
Parker was therefore clearly not unique in attempting a type of restorative justice in which 
the participants were encouraged to settle their differences by arbitration – what could be 
seen as a precursor of the restorative conference. 
Similarly, several of the cases in Parker’s notebooks involved the breaking of contracts by 
domestic servants and labourers. In one such case in July 1805, a dairymaid absconded from 
her master’s premises before her labour contract had expired. She was pursued for three 
days by the parish constable and brought before Parker, who ordered that her employer 
pay two shillings for the cost of the arrest warrant and the services of a legal clerk, together 
with seven shillings and sixpence for the cost of the parish constable’s time. This sum was 
then ordered to be deducted from the dairymaid’s future wages and she was also ordered 
to complete her employment contract.38  This meant that whilst the dairymaid was 
considerably out of pocket, she did not have to face further charges and also ensured that 
she remained in employment during a somewhat turbulent economic period.  
 
VI PUBLIC APOLOGIES AS RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
In the first quarter of the eighteenth century a new phenomenon began to appear in 
newspapers; that of the printed public apology.  Such apologies make their first appearance 
in the late-1710s and continue through to the end of the nineteenth century, though they 
appear to have been most popular in a fifty-year period straddling the turn of the 
eighteenth century39. The apologies rapidly assumed a largely standardised format; they 
normally began with one of three stock phrases: ‘Pardon Asked’, ‘Beg Pardon’, or ‘Public 
Apology’, and then continued with the name and profession of the apologist, followed by 
                                                 
38
 See D.J. Cox, and B. Godfrey (eds.), Cinderellas & Packhorses: A History of the Shropshire Magistracy 
(Logaston Press, 2005), pp. 28-31 for further details of Thomas Netherton Parker’s life and career as 
magistrate. 
39
 One unusual example appears as an apparent outlier in The Times, 8 April 1919, in which a Mrs Drew of 
Bromley, Kent paid for an advertisement to appear stating that she had recently been the subject of 
‘slanderous statements’ and that as a result, she would ‘not hesitate to enforce a public apology or establish 
her innocence by action in the courts when she discovers the originator of the slander’. 
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the date and time of the offence, a brief summary of the offence with the name and address 
of the victim and an explanation that by granting the offender the chance to make such a 
public apology the victim has spared the offender an appearance in court: 
Pardon asked; and a caution to Boatmen. 
WHEREAS I JOHN CUFLIN, Boat-master of Leicester, did in the night of the 21st of 
October instant, cut, take, and carry away from a Boat at Shipley Wharf, a Rope 
belonging to Mr. Robert Shaw, of Shawley, in the county of Derby, and by my asking 
his pardon in this public manner, has kindly stopped all prosecution against me.  
his 
JOHN X CUFLIN 
mark 
Witness, 
Paul Brentnall 
Joseph Boam 
Shipley Wharf, October 22nd 180140 
Contrary to the ‘conventional’ view of a ‘shift from a participatory system of discretionary 
justice to a monopolistic criminal justice system’ in the early and mid-nineteenth century, 
Churchill has recently argued that ‘ordinary people made extensive use of the criminal law, 
yet only as one means of redress among many available’, and the use of printed public 
apologies can be seen to reinforce this interpretation of the disjuncture between informal 
individual interventions and the increasingly State-sponsored criminal justice system. 41  His 
argument that many private individuals remained ‘reluctant prosecutors’ would seem to be 
strengthened by the fact that such apologies were not only utilised as a victim-led method 
of restoring the status quo for petty offences such as the one reproduced above, but also in 
cases where the offence was more serious in nature, including interpersonal violence.42  The 
offence described below exemplifies this, and was by no means an isolated example: 
PARDON ASKED – WHEREAS I, LEVI WARD, of Clayton, in the County of York, Weaver, 
did, on the 31st Day of July last (1821), assault and ill-treat Mr Benjamin Wood, of 
Bowling, Inspector of Worsted Yarn, for which Offence he has commenced a 
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 Derby Mercury, 5 November 1801. 
41
 D. Churchill, Crime Control & Everyday Life in the Victorian City, p. 189. 
42
 Ibid, p. 193. 
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Prosecution; but on my agreeing to ask his Pardon and pay Expenses, he has 
consented to stop the Prosecution. I do, therefore, most humbly ASK his PARDON, and 
thank him for his Lenity, and promise never to be guilty of the like Offence again.43  
This particular apology is unusual in that it is concerned with an attack on a Worsted 
Inspector. Such men were employed by the Worsted Committee in several Yorkshire towns 
and cities from the 1770s and had considerable powers within the community; they had the 
power to enter the homes and premises of employees and search for misappropriated 
pieces of worsted. If any were found, the penalties could be severe; a month’s 
imprisonment or a maximum fine of £20 – a considerable sum in the late-eighteenth 
century. Unsurprisingly, such men were often not popular in their home towns and were 
occasionally the victims of reprisals.44 That this particular Inspector was prepared to forego 
the more usual course of formal legal action is worthy of comment – perhaps the Inspector 
simply possessed more humanity than was normally credited to such officials. The example 
above however is typical in that it closes with a promise not to reoffend.  Such future-
oriented narratives appear in a high percentage of such apologies, and emphasise the fact 
that the publication of such apologies could only ever be a single event rather than a 
structured programme of reintegration within society, albeit one that had undergone a 
period of negotiation.  The authors of this article hope to carry out a large-scale research 
investigation into such apologies and will utilise life-course analysis to investigate whether 
or not the apologists did in fact desist from further bad behaviour – in essence to see 
whether or not such apologies did in fact work from a restorative justice perspective. 45 
Such public apologies were nearly always printed on the first page of the newspaper; an 
obvious attempt to ensure their notice by a wide audience.  The fact that until the 1850s 
newspapers were out of the financial reach of the majority of the working population due to 
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2013). 
45
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Family Life, Employment, and Offending (OUP, 2007) and S. Farrall, B. Godfrey, & D.J. Cox, Serious Offenders: A 
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 15 
 
a combination of high Stamp Duty being imposed upon them and low levels of adult literacy 
suggests that such apologies were not mainly designed to publicly shame the offender 
within his or her own social class, but rather to express to the victim’s peers his or her 
magnanimity and generosity of spirit, and also to reaffirm that they were the blameless and 
innocent party in the matter in question, as exemplified in the following apology: 
PARDON ASKED 
I, SARAH CLARKE, of Greet’s Green, West Bromwich, wife of John Clarke, Puddler, do 
hereby EXPRESS my SORROW and regret at having committed a most violent and 
gross Assault upon Joseph Haden, one of the Officers of the Oldbury County Court, 
and do gratefully acknowledge the kindness of the High Bailiff in refraining from 
prosecuting me for the same – Dated 23rd October 1866.  SARAH CLARKE 
Witness – J. DALBY 46 
The above example is interesting in that not only does it publicly shame the female 
transgressor, but it also names her husband and details his profession, thereby ensuring 
Sarah’s total humiliation – a clear example of disintegrative shaming.  
The number of printed public apologies in newspapers reduced considerably from the 
mid-nineteenth century onward; this was due to a number of factors, most prominently 
the rise of the police as a prosecuting agency following the 1856 County and Borough 
Police Act (19 & 20 Vic c69), which made the presence of police forces mandatory 
throughout all English and Welsh boroughs and counties, and the 1855 Criminal Justice 
Act (18 & 19 Vict c129), which gave increased powers to magistrates to try more offences 
summarily, thereby reducing the chance of an offender receiving a longer prison 
sentence at either Quarter Sessions or Assizes; it is possible that such a move reduced 
the worry of a victim that an offender would serve an unnecessarily harsh prison 
sentence for what could be seen as a fairly minor act of bad behaviour.  
 
VII MODERN RESTORATIVE JUSTICE THEORY AND ITS APPLICATION TO HISTORICAL 
RESTORATIVE PRACTICES 
This section of the article focuses on the theories underpinning modern restorative justice 
practices and ideas, contending that many such modern theories and practices can be 
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evidenced in the historical examples discussed in the first section of the article. The 
underlying principles of restorative justice are first outlined followed by an overview of how 
several aspects of restorative justice theories and concepts relate to the historical examples 
given above. 
Marshall suggests that there is a dedication amongst practitioners to an alternative view of 
justice that focuses on people, and rather than viewing offences as a crime against the 
state, viewing them as offences against people and how this can be repaired.47 In a similar 
vein, Pranis argues that whilst the definition is contested and varies throughout the 
literature there are a set of core values that exist in restorative justice, these being: dignity, 
inclusion, humility, respect, mutual care, and non-domination.48 Sharpe also argues that 
whilst definitions vary at the heart of any restorative justice programs the aims are to place 
decisions in the hands of those who are affected by a crime, make justice more healing and 
transformative, and, reduce the likelihood of future offending.49 A common misconception 
and misunderstanding of restorative justice is the failure to appreciate the important parts 
of restorative justice lie in the purposes, values and principles which should then guide the 
responses to crime.50 Throughout the literature, a number of underlying principles of 
restorative justice are suggested including: flexibility, non-discrimination, inclusiveness, 
empowerment, responsibility, accountability, honesty, trust, and equality.51 The value of 
restorative justice does not come from the particular methods used, rather the underlying 
values and intentions, and we would argue that many of the historical examples discussed in 
this article exhibit fundamentally exhibit restorative values and intentions. Whilst the 
discussed historical examples may not easily fit in with many of the processes of the current 
English criminal justice system, we contend that they do have resonance with much modern 
restorative justice theory. 
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Zehr and Mika state that the fundamental underlying principles are that crime is a violation 
of people and relationships, these violations cause obligations and liabilities for a number of 
people and restorative justice aims to heal and put right these wrongs.52 The priority in any 
restorative justice process should be to meet the needs of the victim and to ensure that the 
offender is aware of the damage they have caused to people and relationships, and their 
liability to heal that damage.53 Marshall posits that his set of restorative principles may 
orientate any agency that works in relation to crime, these are: the scope for personal 
involvement of those concerned (e.g. victim, offender, families, community); viewing crime 
problems within the social context they occur in; a preventative problem-solving direction; 
and, flexibility and creativity in outcomes that satisfy all stakeholders.54 Zehr provides a 
helpful analogy in terms of restorative justice by providing a restorative ‘lens’ through which 
to view crime and justice.55 The central tenets of this restorative lens are: focusing on harm 
and the needs of victims, the community and offenders; addressing the obligations of 
offenders that arise from harm, but also the obligations of the community; to incorporate 
an inclusive and collaborative process; to involve all legitimate stakeholders; and, to seek to 
put right the wrongs that have happened.56 This ‘lens’ stands as a reminder of the paradigm 
shift that restorative justice requires; a paradigm shift that is clearly apparent throughout 
the above historical practices, where the responsibility is placed on the offender with 
support from the community to make things right. It is however acknowledged that there 
are problems with each of the historical examples; they should not be seen as paradigms of 
restorative justice.   
Another way of viewing restorative justice is by providing a comparison between the 
questions the Westernised criminal justice system would ask, and contrasting them with the 
questions a restorative justice approach asks.57 When a crime has been committed in the 
criminal justice arena often the questions asked will be: Who has committed the crime? 
What rules have been broken? How should the individual be punished? This ties in with the 
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idea in the Western criminal justice system that a criminal act is a violation of the state, and 
as such is punished by the state in its assumed role as victim. Using restorative justice, the 
crime is seen as a violation of relationships and therefore different questions will be asked. 
Through a restorative ‘lens’, the questions asked will be more along the lines of: what 
happened? Who has been affected by this act and how? How can this be righted in a way 
that those involved find satisfactory? Where does the responsibility lie? How can things be 
done differently to prevent this happening again?58 The focus here is on hearing different 
perspectives and how all stakeholders can be supported moving forward, whereas a 
Western criminal justice model approach will instead attempt to fact find and punish those 
involved with a means to deter. When considering the historic practices discussed in this 
article, viewing the practices through a restorative lens is in fact easier than the more 
Westernised traditional criminal justice concepts.  
 
VIII AGENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
O’Mahoney and Doak’s empowerment theory is a newer contribution to the theoretical 
understanding of RJ and has an interesting and relevant take on the practicing of restorative 
justice.59 They argue that whilst restorative justice has a myriad of definitions and processes 
it surrounding it, in a more simplistic interpretation there are two underlying aspects of 
restorative justice: agency and accountability. Simply put, agency refers to giving 
participants the opportunity to act for themselves when wrongdoing has occurred, a right 
which the formalised criminal justice system distinctly takes away.60 Accountability, as 
stated by O’Mahoney and Doak should be taken in its most empowering sense, where 
individuals are able to take responsibility for any harm they have caused and actively decide 
to try and repair this.61  Looking to Parker, the magistrate discussed above, it can clearly be 
seen that he wished to afford those involved in the crime with both agency and 
accountability. By encouraging them to move away from the more formal criminal justice 
system and settle their issues through discussion and agreement they were afforded both 
the means to address the harms caused and to hold those responsible accountable. In the 
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majority of these cases the victims are involved within the decision-making process and 
were able to convey the impact of the crime, both of which are important components in 
restorative processes.62 By creating this space for individuals who have been involved with 
the crime to meet and discuss the incident, Parker afforded them a powerful alternative to 
the more traditional processes they would have gone through otherwise. In both the cases 
of Parker and the printed apologies it can be seen that the individuals involved were 
provided accountability in the sense that they were given space in which to explain their 
behaviour to the victim or community. In this sense, whilst it may be difficult to know how 
these processes were decided upon, and who instigated the procedures (together with an 
uneven power balance in the respect of many of the offenders not being able to read or 
write and therefore almost entirely dependent on the victims or their representatives to 
phrase such apologies), the processes definitely have elements that could be considered 
restorative if we look to O’Mahoney and Doak’s theory.  
 
IX REINTEGRATIVE SHAMING 
Braithwaite’s reintegrative shaming theory has long been used as an underpinning theory 
conveying the underlying mechanisms of a restorative processes.63 He suggests that an 
individual’s pro-social behaviour originates from the desire to belong to a group and avoid 
discontent of those within the group, and argues that key mechanism in restorative justice 
processes lies in relationships. It is thought that antisocial behaviour arose when individuals 
are distanced from social relationships by other individuals who, whilst unimportant, 
reprimand their behaviour.64 When an individual has caused harm, reintegrative shaming 
theory makes the case for community involvement and disapproval when an individual has 
caused.  Importantly, the individual should be treated with respect and reintegrated back 
into the community. The behaviour should not be condoned, however the community 
should make it clear that once they have repaired harm they are to be integrated back into 
the community. This is in direct contrast to ‘stigmatising shaming’ that forces individuals 
who have caused harm to become further disconnected from the community and support 
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that they need i.e. has a disintegrative effect.65 If we look at the above historic practices 
through a reintegrative shaming lens there are certainly areas that can be seen as 
reintegrative. The ability to remain within the community, with their family and with their 
job would have certainly been important for integration, but they were also met with 
disapproval of their behaviour. Particularly with public printed apologies, there is clearly a 
definite element of disapproval of behaviour and community involvement. However, often 
within a printed apology there was also a promise of better behaviour in the future (and our 
ongoing research intends to look into this aspect of the content of printed public apologies 
to see whether or not they were effective in preventing re-offending); clearly aimed at 
seeing the apology as an ongoing process of restorative justice rather than as a single event. 
 
X APOLOGY AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
There is a considerable amount of research that considers the concept of apology within a 
restorative process. Whilst an apology doesn't necessarily have to be part of a restorative 
justice, it is seen as an important part in creating restorative processes that are perceived as 
successful.66 Strang found that what most victims want from their offenders is a sincere 
apology, however, Daly argues that not all individual offenders will have the skill to 
communicate this.67 This may lead to feelings of discontentment from both victims who feel 
they have not got their ‘proper’ apology, together with feelings of frustration from 
offenders who feel unable to fully participate and be heard in a restorative process. Bolivar 
et al found two main causes surrounding why apology seems to satisfy victims who go 
through a restorative process.68 Both of these can be readily applied to the use of public 
printed apologies as seen earlier in this article. The apology allowed for the victim to have 
their status as a victim confirmed (publicly in the case of printed apologies) and shows that 
the offenders willingness to apologise confirmed that they were not intrinsically bad. There 
is certainly a need for more research on public apologies and restorative justice, as there is a 
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need for further research into the complexities of apology within a restorative justice 
process.  
 
XI CONCLUSION 
As Marshall has stated,  
Restorative Justice is not, therefore, a single academic theory of crime or justice, but 
represents, in a more or less eclectic way, the accumulation of actual experience in 
working successfully with particular crime problems. 69  
This article has shown that despite considerable academic research into restorative justice, 
there still remains much confusion as to what exactly all the elements are which make up a 
successful restorative justice programme; often restorative justice appears to be viewed as 
an event rather than as a process, and one whose origins are contested by criminologists 
and sociologists. This is problematical both when trying to decide if a process is genuinely 
restorative or not, and also in the implementation of new strategies.   
We have also argued that to aid with the creation of such a strategy, it is necessary to cast 
an historical eye over past processes that have often occurred either in opposition to, or as 
an adjunct to the prevailing ‘traditional’ state-sponsored criminal justice system in order to 
both learn from past mistakes and gain from past successes. As Cicero stated in his 
vindication of the uses of historical knowledge, ‘to be ignorant of what occurred before one 
was born is to remain forever a child’, and this applies equally to knowledge of the 
antecedents of modern-day restorative justice processes.70 The article has demonstrated 
that prior to the 1970s, when the term ‘restorative justice’ first came into mainstream usage 
by both academics and practitioners alike, there have been numerous examples of practices 
and processes that bear many of the necessary traits of what we now call restorative justice.  
It is not our intention here to make a case for the redeployment of such historical practices, 
but there is clearly a need for a much more coherent strategy when discussing alternative 
methods of justice that may or may not be restorative in nature or intent, and academics 
and practitioners could perhaps do worse than consider elements and ideas from some of 
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the historical examples discussed above in order to develop what perhaps could be viewed 
as a new approach to an old system of justice.  
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